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ASYMMETRJC WAR? 
IMPLICATIONS FOR CHINA'S INFORMATION 
WARFARE STRATEGIES 
Vincent Wei-cheng Wang and Gwendolyn Stamper* 
University of Richmond 
Abstract 
l11is essay discusses the emerging discourse and capability 
of the PRC on information warfare (IW) and lhe implica-
tions of such developments on cross-Strait and US-PRC 
relations. It finds that the PRC's e ndeavors in IW stem 
from the conviction among certain well-informed writers in 
the PLA that IW occupies a crucial place for a Revolution 
in Military Affairs (RMA) in China's military moderniza-
tion. Chinese strategists explore IW's potential for Chin a 
to wage an "asymmetric war" (defined as the use of sur-
prise force by a weaker party against a stronger but vulner-
able adversary) by applying traditional strategems (e.g., 
Sun Tzu's '·overcoming the superior with tbe inferior'' and 
Mao's "people's war") in modern warfare. Chinese strate-
gists argue that IW ca n help China counter overaU Ameri-
can strengths by targeting certain "pockets of excellence," 
ralher than attempting to match America's comprehensive 
power, and pre ent China with a credible military option 
The autho rs ackno wledge the support for this project (rom a University of 
Richmond faculty-student collaborative research grant and Lhe comments of an 
anonymous reviewer of the American llsi(ln Review. A version of this paper was 
presented at the 2002 annual meeting of the American Political Science Association. 
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for achieving its political objective of achieving unification 
with Taiwan (on Beijing's terms) through deception. sur-
prise, and decisiveness. These strategic considerations can 
introduce instability in the Taiwan Strait region. They also 
raise questions about certain conventional aphorisms in 
international relations. The evolution of Chinese military 
doctrine and force structure is traced. Chinese and Ameri-
can concepts of IW are contrasted. Early examples of 
"cyberwar'' between China and the US and between China 
and Taiwan are examined. The article concl udes with a 
cautionary note on an emergent "digital mutual assured 
destruction." 
Know thy enemy, know yourself, your 
victory wjil never be endangered. 
-Sun Tzu. The Art of Wart 
. . . warfare which transcends all bounda-
ries and ljmits - in short, unrestricted 
warfare. 
-Qiao Liang and Wang Xiangsui. 
Unrestricted Warfare2 
Two aphorisms have been widely and uncritically accepted 
by most security scholars and analysts: 1) in a conflict, the 
party with preponderant force prevails -either in coercing the 
weaker party to take an action desired by the former (compel-
lance) or in dissuading the weaker party from taking an action 
detested by the former (deterrence); and 2) although the Peo-
ple's Republic of China (PRC) has refused to renounce the 
t Sun Tzu. The Art of War. ed. and trans. Samuel B. Griffith (New York: 
Ox:ford University Press, 1971). 129, quoted in John Arquilla, David Ronfeldt. 
"Information. Power. and Grand Strategy: In Athena's Camp," in Stuart J.D. 
Schwartzstein. cd.. The Information Revolution and National Security 
(Washington. DC: Center for Strategic and lntcrnntional Studies. 1996), 132. 
2 Qiao Liang and Wang Xiang~ui , Unrestricted Warfare [in Chinl!sej 
(Beijing: PLA Literature and Arts Puhlishing llouse, 1999). The English 
translation of this book. provided by the CIA's FBIS service. is available online 
at <h!tp://cryptome.orglcuwOl.htm>. 
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use of force agai nst Taiwan, it currently has few credible mili-
tary options. 
This article examines the emerging discourse and capability 
of the PRC on information warfare (IW) and discusses the 
implications of these developments on cross-Strait and US-
PRC-Taiwan relations. It argues that the PRC's endeavor in 
IW stems from the belief among certain well-read writers 
within its military (the People's Liberation Army or PLA) that 
IW occupies a crucial place in a Revolution in Military Affairs 
(RMA) in China 's military modernization. These authors 
seem particularly keen on the potential IW holds for China to 
apply traditional stratagems (e.g., Sun Tzu's "overcoming the 
superior with the inferior'· and Mao's "people's war'') in mod-
ern warfare in order to wage a n "asymmetric war" - defined as 
the use of surprise force by a weaker party against a stronger 
force 's vulnerability.3 
Moreover. these analysts think that IW can present a credi-
ble military option for the PRC to reincorporate Taiwan on 
Beijing's terms and to deter the US fro m intervening in the 
cross-Strai t conflict. The July 12, 2002 Pentagon report to 
Congress points out that China 's military is developing strate-
gies and tactics to use "surprise, deception, and shock" in any 
opening military campaign, while "exploring coercive strate-
gies'' designed to bring Taiwan to terms quickly.4 The report 
further states that China ''views information operations/infor-
mation warfare (10/JW) as a strategic weapon'' and is particu-
larly sensitive to the potential asymmetric applicati ons 10/TW 
can have in any future conflict with a technologically supe rior 
J For more discussions on the concept of ··asymmetric conflicts." sec Ben 
D. Mor, '"Asymmetric Conflicts': War Initiation by Weaker Powers:· American 
Political Science Rel'iew 90. no. 1 (March 1996): 234-6: and Ivan Arreguin-Toft, 
··How the Weak Win Wars: A Theory of Asymmetric Conflict," lmemarional 
Sewrity 26. no. I (Summer 2001): 93-128. 
~ Dcpanmcnt of State. "China is Considl!ring a Coercive Strategy on 
Taiwan, DOD Says." <:-mai l update sent by liP Dept. of State <uschinapd@ 
YA IIOO.COM> to <US-CHI A@LIST.STATE.GOV> July 16, 2002. 
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adversary. "5 
For these reasons, a study of China's IW strategies is timely 
and important. Tins study also poses a challenge to the two 
aphorisms posited at the outset. 
IW, The Future War? 
In recent years, there has been an increasing recognition of 
the importance of information technology (IT) on conflict. 
Although "cyberterrorism" certainly presents a frightening 
prospect for "the next war" because various state and nonstate 
actors may manage to eventually possess the technological 
skills or opportunities to engage in extremely damaging 
netwar, tills is by no means the only dangerous implication of 
the information revolution. As three experts prophetically 
wrote, this revolution is enabling new forms of organization 
and new doctrines that will affect the spectrum of conflict, 
including terrorism.6 
While Americans still are grappling with the surprise, 
deception, and shock created by the September 11, 2001 ter-
rorist attacks, some analysts caution about the prospect of 
weaker parties engaging in IW or cyberterrorism against the 
United States or other democracies. This is because in the US, 
it is the private sector, namely those numerous companies 
whose main motive is profit, that control computer ne tworks, 
whereas defending national security falls under the purview of 
the military.7 
5 Department o f Defense, "Annual Report on the Military Power of the 
People's Republic of China," report to Congress purs uant to the FY2000 
National Defense Authorization Act, July 12, 2002, available at <http://www. 
defensclink.millnews/Jul2002/d20020712china.pdi>. 
6 John Arquilla. David Roofeldt. and Michele Zanini. '' Information-Age 
Terrorism." Current History 99, no. 4 (April 2000): 179-85. 
7 John Galvin, " Info War: The Enemy's Camp is a Cube on the O ther 
Side of the Globe. Their Targets? Your Business." Z iff Davis Smarr Business for 
the New Economy, June 1. 2001. 72. 
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In his testimony to the Senate Arms Services Committee 
on March 9, 1999, D eputy Secretary of Defense John Hamre 
said that, although the Pentagon thought it had done a good 
job of protecting national security from hackers. he was wor-
ried about the vulnerability of commercial and financial inter-
ests. "And tllis (electronic) Pearl Harbor's going to be 
different,'' Hamre warned. "It's not going to be against Navy 
ships sitting in a Navy shipyard; it's going to be against com-
me rcial infrastructure, and we don't control that. And there 
has been little progress on that.''8 
Hamre's concern shows that America's very strength -
openness and accessibility of information - could turn into its 
Achilles' Heel. if an adversary can exploit it. The wide diffu-
sion of computers worldwide and interconnectedness of infor-
mation networks convin.ce James Adams, the brainchild of 
iDefense, a company that aspires to be ' 'the Central Intelli-
gence Agency for the private sector," that the virtual world is 
where the next war will be waged, because for the first time in 
history, the weapons are available to everyone.9 This fact Jets 
some weaker parties with grievances contemplate that they 
can take on stronger parties and perhaps even prevail in an 
"asymmetric conflict. '' This trend could be destabilizing. 10 
D efense expert Dan Kuehl of National Defense University 
lists China, Russia, Iraq, Libya, terrorist groups like Osama 
bin Laden's Al-Qaeda, and even unsavory organizations in 
friendly nations as "cyberthreats. " 11 In his testimony to the 
8 "Pe ntagon Officials Warn of an Electronic Pearl Harbor." Associated 
Press, March 9, 1999. accessed from Lexis-Nexus. See also, Galvin. ·' Info War." 
72. 
9 James Adams gives an ~xhaustivc history ol information warfa re. as well 
as the US military's capabilities, stating categorically that the Air Force can track 
hackers back to their computers and launch "computer bombs." However. many 
of America's enemies also have the same skills. See James Adams, Tlze Next 
World War (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1998). 
10 1buha V. Paul. Asymmetric Conflicts: War Initiation by Weaker Powers 
ew York: Cambridge University Press, 1994). 
II Galvin. " Info War." 72. 
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Senate Government Affairs Committee on June 24, 1998, CIA 
director George Tenet told lawmakers that intrusion into gov-
ernment computers will become increasingly more sophisti-
cated and better organized and is likely to involve hostile 
nations. "Potential attackers range from na tional intelligence 
and military organizations, terrorists, criminals, industrial com-
petitors, hackers and disgruntled or disloyal insiders.'' He fur-
ther said, "We know with specificity of several nations that are 
working on developing an information warfare capability."12 
In light of the perceived technological superiority of the 
military of the United States, the PRC appears keen on pursu-
ing IO/IW development as a key part of its overall military 
modernization and concomitantly exploring IW as an alterna-
tive way to counter US power. The Pentagon report analyzes 
China's security assessment: 
While seeing opportunity and benefit in interactions with 
the United States - primarily in terms of trade and technol-
ogy - Beijing apparently believes that !he United States 
poses a significant long-term chaUenge. China's leaders 
have asserted that the United States seeks to maintain a 
dominant geostrategic position by containing the growth of 
Chinese power .... Most importantly, China has adopted an 
ambivalent if not skeptical attitude toward the U.S. pres-
ence in the Asia-Pacific region. 13 
As the article will show, Chinese strategists have devoted 
considerable interests to exploring the potential asymmetric 
applications that 10/IW can have in a future conflict with a 
technologically superior adversary. The Pentagon report Lists 
12 While Tenet did not identify the countries. committee chairman Fred 
Thompson (R-Tenn). who received a classified briefing a day before, namt:d 
some of them. Citing published reports, Thompson said that China. Russia. 
Libya, Iraq, Iran. and at least seven other countries were developing rw 
programs. See "CIA Director Warns of Intrusion in to Government Computers," 
Associated Press, June 24, 1998. accessed from Lexis-Nexus. and Jennifer 
Mateyaschuk. "Nothing to Raise A Glass About," Information Week. July 6. 
1998. 16. 
13 Departmc01 of Defense, '·Annual Report," 8. 
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some of the endeavors beyond scholar ly discussions by the 
PRC to develop IW capabilities such as: 
• Increasing the amount and complexity of 10/IW compo-
nents in several recent exercises, 
• Increasing the PLA 's proficiency in defensive measures, 
most notably. against the threat of computer virus, 14 
and 
• Recruiting specialists via the PLA's reserve officer 
selection program, by sponsoring the college education 
of students or offering to repay loans after graduation in 
return for a military service commitment. 
The report concludes that the PRC has the capability to 
penetrate poorly protected US computer systems and poten-
tially use computer network attack (CAN) to strike specific 
US civilian and military infrastructures. 15 
This article shows that China's approaches to IW pose fun-
damental challenges to certajn conventional maxims of inter-
national politics and raise important questions about national 
security. These questions confirm the growing salience of 
technology in international relations and necessitate a fresh 
understanding of the nature of war. 
The transitions to an information age and the shifts from 
the industrial age to the postindustrial age have caused many 
analysts to proclaim that "technology transforms world polit-
ics"1r. and " information is power." 17 However, a full grasp of 
14 Drawing on Sun Tzu's adage, " Knowing the enemy and yourself. you can 
fight a hundred battles and win them all." a recent PLA' Daily art icle makes the 
case that preserving information security is extremely important. " Jn 
information warfare. not only must we 'know ourselves and the enemy: we must. 
more importantly. make sure that the ·enemy does not have the knowledge about 
us: and use our knowledge about the enemy to attack the enemy that does not 
have knowledge about us.'' See Tang, Chaojing. " Information Security Plays a 
D.:cisivc Role in Military Struggles," B eij i11g Jiefangjun Bao (Internet version) 
July 17. 2002, translated as '·Article Underscores Information Security in 
lnfonnation Warfare:· FBfS Daily Report: China (Document Number: FBIS-
CHl-2002-07 18). 
15 Department of Defense. " A nnual Report," 31. 
16 Jeffrey R. Cooper, "Another View of Information Warfare: Conmct in 
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the effects of information technology on interstate conflict 
remains elusive. What Robert Keohane and Joseph Nye call a 
"new conventional wisdom., holds that the information revolu-
tion has a leveling effect. promising to enhance the power of 
weak state and oonstate actors vis-a-vis that of powerful ones. 
However, many dispute the "advantage to the weak" argu-
ment, contending that the notion of "asymmetric conflict" 
sounds appealing but is not feasible. An exploration of this 
issue should begin with an understanding of the basic 
concepts. 
John Alger, an IW expert, argues that IW "consists of 
those actions intended to protect, exploit, corrupt, deny, or 
destroy information or information resources in order to 
achieve a significant advantage, objective, or victory over an 
adversary:'18 If we follow Alger's definition, we can argue 
that human beings always have been concerned with protect-
ing prized information from adversaries. Numerous examples 
of information warfare can be found throughout human 
history. 19 
However, it was not until the Persian Gulf War (199J) that 
the decisive role of modern information technology in warfare 
became indisputably clear. The impressive demonstration of 
the ability of the US to exploit information convinced many 
nations that a direct military confrontation with the US likely 
would result in defeat. In the 1999 NATO military campaign, 
the Information Age." in Stuart J .D. Schwartzste in. ed., The Information 
Revolwion and Nationol Security (Washington, D C: Cente r for Strategic and 
Inte rna tional Studies, 1996). 109-31. 
17 Robert 0 . Keohane and JosephS. Nye, " Power and Inte rdependence in 
the Information Age,'' Foreign Affairs 77, no. 5 (September-October 1998): 81-
94. 
18 Wino Schwarta u, lnfomiUtion Warfare, 2d. ed. (Thunder's Mouth Pre&>, 
1996), 12. 
19 Dorothy E. Denning's book provides many inte resting historica l 
examples. Sec Doro thy E. Denning, Information Warfare and Security (New 
York: Addison Wesley, 1999), 13-6; see also James Adams, The Next World War. 
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the Pentagon successfully launched a cyberattack against 
Serbia. 
America's military successes have inspired countries like 
China to avidly study and develop IW in an effort to counter 
US power and to explore ways to gain an asymmetric advan-
tage vis-a-vis the US. Art Money. assistant secretary of 
defense for command, control, and intelligence, asserts: "1l1e 
rest of the world realizes that you don't take the U .S. on in a 
military frontal sense, but you can probably bring it down or 
cause severe damage in a more oblique way. And that's where 
the vulnerability in the U.S. resides.''20 
In recent months, leading Chinese ntiJitary journals have 
pub]jshed a number of noteworthy articles discussing IW in 
the context of "asymmetric warfare."2 t 1l1e most notable 
example is Unresrricted Warfare, written by two PLA colonels 
in early 1999. In this potentially very significant book, the 
authors propose various tactics for developing countries such 
as China to compensate for their military inferiority vis-a-vis 
the US. They argue that a digital attack may give China a sig-
nificant asymmetric advantage and even bring about the 
defeat of the US.22 
In this article, China's IW doctrine and capability is 
examined. TI1e focus is on the political objectives of China's 
20 James Adams, ''Virtual D efense." Foreign Affairs 80. no. 3 (May/June 
2001 ): 102. 
21 Michae l Pill bury provides a tour d'lroriwn on the contending 
perspectives by Chinese mjlitary thinkers on the country's future security 
environment. Sec Michael Pillsbury, China Debates the Fuwre Security 
Environme/11 (Washington. DC: National Defense U niversity Press. 2000), 
especially chapter 6. For three useful pioneering syntheses of these a rticles on 
IW. translated into English and introduced to the Weste rn audience, see M. 
Ehsan Ahrari, "U.S. Military Strategic Perspectives on the PRC: New Frontiers 
of Information-Based War," Asian Stm'ey 37, no. 12 (1997): 11 63-81; James C. 
Mulvenon, "The PLA and lnforma Lion Warfare," in James C. Mulvenon and 
Richard H. Yang. eds .. The People's Liberation A rmy in the Information Age 
(Santa Monica. CA: RAND, 1999). L75-86: and Timothy Thomas, "Ch.ina's 
E lectronic Strategies." Military Review (May-June 200L): 47-54. 
22 Qiao and Wang, Unrestricted Warfare. 
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IW and the impucations of asymmetric warfare. The rest of 
the article is divided into five sections. Section two defines IW 
and explains why IW is particularly appealing to developing 
countries such as China. Section three provides a succinct 
overview of the evolving military doctrine and force structure 
of the PLA, witl1 emphasis on the role of IW in the current 
doctrine of Local War Under Modem High-Tech Conditions. 
Section four explains the Chinese IW strategies in more detail. 
by contrasting the Chinese and American discourses on IW. It 
argues that the Chinese seek to combine IW with traditional 
Chinese stra tegies (such as those of Sun Tzu and Mao) in for-
mulating a superior strategy. It also explores some of the pos-
sible challenges that the Chinese approach to IW may pose to 
Western mainstream theories and doctrines. Section five illus-
trates several early examples of Chinese IW- "cybernational-
ism" against Taiwanese, Japanese, and American interests in 
light of foreign policy disputes and amphibious war games that 
integrated electronic warfare. Section six, the conclusion, reit-
erates the point that technology may constitute a new source 
of interstate conflict. 
Information Warfare: The New Weapon of the Weak? 
The discourse on IW bas been dominated by the West. 
This article argues that Eastern and Western notions of IW 
share varying limitations regarding the scope and intention of 
IW use. As an example typifying the Western perspective, the 
Joint Doctrine for Command and Control Warfare (C2W) 
defines information warfare as '·actions taken to achieve infor-
mation security by affecting adversary information, informa-
tion-based processes, information systems, and computer-
based networks while defending one's own information-based 
processes, information systems, and computer-based 
networks. " 2.1 
2.1 Ahrari, " U.S. Military Strategic Perspectives on the PRC." 1164. 
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Traditionally, Western military scholars have been con-
cerned mainly with offensive IW as a mechanism to attack 
increasingly dependent information processes and systems. 
IW focuses on specific attacks of the adversary's command and 
control center through the use of smaller force and more 
sophisticated technology, bringing an end to multiyear, attri-
tion-oriented battles. rw focuses not only on the possession of 
advanced technologies, but also on mechanisms of integration, 
designing effective "synergies" to rapidly coordinate the other-
wise fragmented military for home network defense as well as 
the invasion of foreign information system. The scope of IW 
differs both individually and culturally, and can invade both 
the private and civilian spheres of everyday ljfe. 
Made possible by technological advances in communica-
tion and computation, IW is an integral aspect of a larger phe-
nomenon that is generally known as the "evolution in Military 
Affairs (RMA)." As M. Ehsan Ahrari points out, recent dis-
cussions on RMA have srufted from a narrow focus on tech-
nology to the consideration of the revolutionary impact 
technology will have on war fighting concepts, opera tional 
techniques, and organizations. Describing RMA, Andrew 
Krepinevich writes: 
[A military revolution] occurs when the application of new 
technologies into a significant number of military systems 
combines with innovative operational concepts and o rgani-
zational adaptation in a way that fundamentally alters Lhe 
cha racter and conduct of conflict. H does so by producing a 
dramatic increase - often an order of magnitude or greater 
in the combat po tential and military effectiveness of armed 
fo rces.24 
Following this definition, some analysts, such as Ahrari , 
argue that the Chinese armed forces as an institution are 
undergoing an RMA. The supposed quantum leap in combat 
24 Andrew F. Krepinevich, "Cavalry to Computer: The Pattern of Military 
Revolutions:· National Interest. no. 37 (Fa ll 1994): 30. 
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effectiveness as a result of RMA is a major rationale for 
China's IW development. 
However, at a more general level, modern information 
technology likewise has created many new possibilities for 
offensive IW, as pointed out by Denning: 
Operations can take place in an instant and come from any-
where in the world. They can be orchestrated and con-
ducted from the comfort of a home or office, without the 
risks of spies and undercover operations, physical break-ins, 
and the handling of explosives. The number of targets that 
potentially could be reached is staggering. Operations 
could be launched by state or nonstate actors, and by indi-
vidual groups. The cost to the perpetrators might be negli-
gible, the losses to the victims immeasurable.25 
Dennjng's description illustrates the several important 
ways that IW has altered the nature of war in the information 
era. First, it introduces the intriguing possibility of asymmetric 
warfare, defined as a military strategy by the weaker actor to 
not attack the stronger party directly, but to focus its attack on 
where the strong party is vulnerable and then to prevail. The 
Chinese reason that the traditional notion of "overcomjng the 
superior with the jnferior," which draws inspiration from Sun 
Tzu's adage of " winning the battle without fighting" and 
Mao's "People's War" doctrine, rather than being obsolete, 
might give them an edge in developing IW. Asymmetric war-
fare challenges the traditional realist and neorealist schools by 
redefining power (offense-defense calculations). and by ren-
dering the outcome of international conflict more 
indeterminate. 
Second, IW is an epitome of what is often called "uncon-
ventional" or "irregular'' conflict. It does not take the form of 
mass armies engaging one another on the battlefield, or the 
traditional air- or sea-based military operations in support of 
25 Denning. lnformalion Warfare and Security, 11. 
179 
such engagement.26 The anonymity of attackers, the omni-
presence of battlefields, the lopsided advantage favoring 
offense over defense, and the attack that is of shorter duration 
and can be automated make TW a curious weapon of choice by 
the weak. one that seemingly involves little cost but promises 
to reap substantial benefit.27 
The authors of Unrestricted Warfare advocate expanding 
combat beyond the battlefields to include computer warfare, 
international terrorism, biological and chemical warfare, eco-
nomic and financial warfare, and more. Their views clearly 
affirm IW's unconventional character: 
When we suddenly realize that all these non-war actions 
may be the new factors constituting future warfare, we have 
to come up with a new name for this new form of war: 
Warfare which transcends all boundaries and limits - in 
short, unrestricted warfare.28 
The authors conclude: 
Clearly, it is precisely the diversity of the means employed 
that has enlarged the concept of warfare. Moreover, the 
enlargement of the concept of warfare, has, in turn. resulted 
in enlargement of the realm of war-related activities .... 
The battlefield is next to you and the enemy is on the net-
work. Only there is no smell of gunpowder or the odor of 
blood. . . . Obviously warfare is in the process of tran-
scending the domains of soldiers, military units. and mili-
tary affai rs, and is increasingly becoming a matter for 
politicians. scien tists, and even bankers.29 
26 For an overview of tbe changing character of warfare, see Martin Van 
Creveld. The Transformation of War (New York: Free Press. 1991 ). 
Z1 As Denning puts it. " Funding a conventional military il. not cheap. A 
single jet can cost a hundred million dollars or more. Then there arc ship , tanks, 
spy satell.ites, and huge armed forces. By comparison. $1 million to $10 million 
would amply fund a highly paid lW team of ten to 20 hackers usmg stale-of-the 
art computers. TI1e hacking tools themselves can be downloaded wtthout cost 
from Internet sites all over the world." Information Warfare and Security, 17. 
28 Qiao and Wang, Unrestricted Warfare. quoted in Adams, "Virtual 
Defense," 103. 
29 Qiao and Wang. Unrestricted Warfare, quoted in Bill G.;rtz. The China 
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In a larger strategic context, the PRC's interest in lW and 
other forms of asymmetric warfare stems from its perception 
of the post-Cold War security environment. Most Chinese 
view what they call American ''hegemonisrn" and "unilateral-
ism" that is buttressed by America's military power as the 
main threat to China's security interests. 
The demise of the Soviet Union left the US the unchal-
lenged military superpower in a new and ambiguous unipolar 
power structure. Emerging political and economic tensions 
have caused certain dissatisfied states to search for a tool 
through which to express their increasing frustration.30 Recog-
nizing the virtually impregnable forces of the comprehensive 
American power, smaller and militarily inferior actors increas-
ingly have been drawn to find ways to isolate and penetrate 
weaknesses in American defense through the use of asymmet-
ric warfare. Viewed in this context, the September 11 terrorist 
attacks on the US constitute a form of asymmetric ''warfare:· 
In many ways, information warfare lends itself to the 
exploitation of asymmetric conflict, as such an attack 1) can 
have a crippling effect on multiple operations, and 2) can be 
done by a militarily and economically disadvantaged state or 
even nonstate actor. As the PRC strives to become an inter-
national superpower, asymmetric IW serves as compensation 
for its inferior military strength relative to American force. 
The PRC cannot match superior American military technol-
ogy. However, IW presents possibilities for the PRC to match 
the US in other ways, such as damaging less protected infor-
mation networks, where America's overall strengths lie. 
Threat: How the People's Republic Targets America (Washington. DC: Regenc), 
2000). 16. 
10 For s tudents of the power transitions theory school, today's China. 
dissatisfied with the existing world order and experiencing rapid growth in its 
capabilities. evokes characteristics of an ami-status quo power with negative 
connotations for systemic stability. Ronald L. Tammer et al., Power Tra11sitions: 
Stratcgie~ for the 21" Century (New Yorlc: Chatham House, 2000); and Aaron L. 
Friedberg. '·Ripe for Rivalry: Prospects for Peace in a Multipolar Asia," 
lmernarional Security 18, no. 3 (Winter 1993/94): 5-33. 
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The PRC"s love affair with asymmetric warfare evolves 
from a distinctive Maoist doctrine of people's war that stresses 
numeric strength over technological prowess. The next section 
surveys the PRC's changing doctrine and force structure. 
From People's War to High-Tech War-3 1 
The PRC's current foray into IW reveals the protracted 
evolution of its doctrine and force structure since the "people's 
war" of its early years. Figure 1 distinguishes four stages, 1) 
People 's War, 2) People's War under Modern Conditions, 3) 
Local War, and 4) Loca l War under Modern High-Technology 
Conditions. and ummarizes the changing relationship of PLA 
doctrinal development to force structure. 
ll 111is section draws mainly rrom Dennis Blasko. ""PLA Force Structure: 
A 20-Ycar Retrospective," m Jamt:s C. Mulvcnon and Andrew N.D. Yang, eds .. 
Seeking Truth From Fact.f: A Retrospective 0 11 Chinese Miliwry Studies in cite 
Post·Afao Era (Slolnta Monic<l, CA: RAND. 2001 ) 51-8. 
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People's War 
In the late 1970s. the PLA, over four million strong. was 
structured, using the doctrine of "people's war." to defend the 
Chinese mainland from threats such as the Soviet Union. 
Emerging from the turbulen t Cultural Revolution (1966-76), 
China's reformist leaders acknowledged the need for military 
modernization. but nonetheless assigned it last among the 
Four Modernizations. The low priority for military moderniza-
tion translated directly to low defense budgets, a situation that 
was a key constraint on military modernization into the late 
1990s. 
The PLA 's force structure was dominated by the army and 
had a continental orientation. Its ground forces were organ-
ized around infantry corps, also called field armies, which gen-
erally had three infantry divisions and smaller armor, 
engineer, artillery. and other combat support or combat ser-
vice support units. A large militia would complement main 
and local force units as they "lured the enemy in deep.'' Air 
and naval forces primarily bad a defensive mission and, for the 
most part. operated independently of the ground forces. 
People's War 1111der Modern Conditions 
[n the late 1970s and early 1980s. PLA strategists began 
considering a doctrinal revision that was intended to defend 
China closer to its borders and fight the Soviets in a more 
mobile style of war with a combined arms and joint force. The 
use of nuclear weapons also was envisaged. The new doctrine 
became known as People's War under Modern Conditions. 
It called (or a more flexible, professional PLA, incorporat-
ing increased numbers of modern weapons into its inventory. 
The ground forces emphasis shifted more to tanks, self-pro-
pelled artillery, and armored personnel carriers. However, the 
cost of equipping enough of the force with sufficient modern 
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weapons to fight the Soviets was prorubitive to the Chinese 
budget. Beginning in the 1980s, PLA infantry units began to 
be issued enough trucks to make them road-mobile. 
Local War 
Between 1985 and 1988, PLA personnel were reduced to 
three million. The reduction would permit the integration of 
branches of the PLA ground forces with its naval and air 
forces, a requirement to conduct modern warfare. In 1985, 
Deng Xiaoping forecast that the threat of a major war was 
remote. Instead, the more likely scenario would be a limited, 
local war on China's periphery. The formation of small, 
mobile, "Fist'' or "Rapid Reaction Units (RRUs) was a major 
organizational development peculiar to the Local War doc-
trine. Despite these dramatic changes in the military, how-
ever, defense budgets remained tight until the end of the 
L980s. 
The PLA suffered a blow to its prestige as a result of its 
role in the 1989 Tiananmen massacre. One method to boost 
its prestige was to increase its budget and purchase new weap-
ons. Meanwhile, the demise of the Soviet Union provided an 
opportunity to the Chinese government to spend some of the 
new money it now was willing to devote to the military for the 
purchase of advanced military hardware that the West had 
denied to China since 1989. The implosion of the USSR also 
forced the PLA to reexamine the threat it faced. 
Local War under Modern High- Technology Conditions 
The GuJf War forced a change in the attitudes of many of 
the PLA old guard, who emphasized the role of man over 
weapons. TI1e war was said to be an example of what the PLA 
theoreticians now called Local War under Modern High-Tech-
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nology Conditions (LWUMHTC). By tbe mid-1990s, 
LWUMHTC had become the dominant doctrine in the PLA. 
At the same time, some PLA strategists expanded their study 
of other concepts of fu ture high-technology warfare, including 
lW, which became known under the rubric, RMA. Between 
1997 and 2000, another half million personnel were shed from 
the ranks. The major focus of PLA operational planning in 
the late 1990s had become the preparation of military options 
and capabilities to ensure that Taiwan would not seek indepen-
dence. The possibility that the US miJitary might become 
involved in the defense of Taiwan is a worst-case factor that 
PLA planners also must consider. Taiwan·s location invites 
scenarios of LWUMHTC to be applied to it. 
It should be pointed out that, for the past two decades, 
multiple doctrinal concepts have existed or been in develop-
ment concurrently within the PLA. Even though the size of 
the PLA and its doctrine have changed over time, elements 
within it differ in structure, mission, and doctrinal orientations, 
yet exist concurrently. Even today, many ground force units 
still are best suited for People's War operations to defend the 
Chinese mainland. Others, such as the RRUs, have mobilized 
to the point that they are trained for a role in LWUMHTC. A 
very few units, such as missile and electronic warfare units, 
aJso are beginning to develop capabi lities suitable for twenty-
first century RMA warfare, in addi tion to being integral to 
Local War scenarios. 
IW holds special appeal to top PLA brass, which sees it as 
a way of bypassing all the deficiencies most PLA commanders 
and researchers recognize. Sometimes these are referred to as 
"killer" weapons or " trump cards" or "magic weapons" 
(shashoujian) that can overcome .inherent weaknesses in the 
PLA to inflict surprise attacks.32 
J2 Paul H .B. Godwin. "Compensating for Deficiencies: Doctrinal 
Evolution in the Chinese Pcople·s Liberation Army: 1978·l999:· in Mulvenon 
and Yang. Seeking Truth Fro111 Facts, llO; and Alexander Chieh-chcng Huang. 
·'Transformation and Refinement of Chinese Military Doctrine: Ret1ection and 
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Noting these interesting (and some even farfetched) discus-
sions, Paul Godwin, a respected American expert on the PLA. 
provides a more realistic assessment. He asserts that a persis-
tent "doctrine-capability gap" exists - in other words, doctri-
nal development seems often to have gotten ahead of actual 
force modernization. 
Simply stated, the vast majority of Chjna's ships and rur-
craft are obsolete .... They are simply not capable of con-
ducting the kind of war their doctrine envisions: a short, 
high-intensily conflict fought for limited political objectives 
within a confined theatre of operalions.33 
That the Chinese are nevertheless serious about IW indi-
cates that they anchor their IW strategies in a broader politico-
military context and seek to compensate technical inferiority 
with good strategies. Their approach marks an interesting 
contrast with the mainstream Western concepts of IW. 
Elements of China's IW Strategies 
ln theory, information and asymmetric warfare can alter 
traditional power structures because a weaker state can plausi-
bly penetrate its stronger enemy's network system. However, 
utilization of IW depends not only on sophisticated technol-
ogy, but also on the integrative use of networked information 
processes. The central role of information has moved the 
armed forces into a network-based organization, integrating 
the military system so that it can interlink and interact to cre-
ate a limilless extension of its arms and services. Joint opera-
tions, network warfare, and information warfare have enabled 
one another's mutual growth, providing both tremendous 
strengths and weaknesses for the military capabilities of 
Critique on the PLA's View," in Mulvenon and Yang, Seeking Truth From Facts. 
136. 
3:1 Godwin. "Compensating for Dcriciencics." 114. 
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stronger states.34 Networked IW represents an intriguing pro-
gress: moves toward information systems and networks not 
only are advantageous but increasingly necessary for stronger 
states. 
However, while network-based operations enable 
enhanced coordination of skilled attacks, a dependence on 
information can leave the military vulnerable to attacks on its 
information base, leaving its divisions disintegrated and help-
less. Thus. the side of strong American information knowl-
edge also potentially exposes a weak side to a determined and 
increasingly sophisticated adversary. 
China's IW Possibilities 
The Chinese thinkers are keen on these paradoxes. For 
example, PLA scholar Su Enze notes that the irony of IW is, 
as states develop further technology, it is easier to reproduce 
and also becomes more vulnerable to attack.35 
As technology and know-bow continue to spread through-
out the world, American resource advantages in regard to the 
security of its information and information systems gradually 
may erode vis-a-vis a weaker but determined rival that is 
developing IW capability before more resources and techno-
logical developments are initiated to reestablish the lead. 
PLA strategists reason that the field for offense-defense calcu-
lation appears temporarily leveled during such "windows of 
opportunity." A recent PLA publication postulates that 
advantage goes to a weaker offensive party: 
Informa tion warfare is an all-directional, three-dimensional 
confrontation. " In offensive, it can infiltrate into every 
34 Fang Fenghui. ''Grasp the Characteristics of Joint Operations Pertaining 
to Lbe Time," Beijing Jiefangjrm Bao ( Internet version) June 5. 2001. translated as 
"Article on Characteristics of Military Joint Operations in Information Age,'' 
FBJS Daily Repon: China (Document Number: FBIS-CHI-2001-0605). 
l5 Ahrari . •·u.s. Military Strategic Perspectives on the PRC." l168-9. 
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nook and cranny and in defense, it can stop the infiltration 
of even one tiny drop of water." ln this context, the con-
frontation between the offensive and the defensive parties 
are "asymmetrical," and the cost of a reliable defensive sys-
tem is a lot mo re than the cost that the offensive side would 
pay. 
However, the author also emphasizes the importance of defen-
sive IW: 
Owing to the fact the material resources the offensive side 
needs in an information warfare are relatively little, and the 
most precious resources are the attacker's wisdom and 
resourcefulness, the traditional strategy of "defending by 
attacking" - a concept based on the conservation of total 
resources - is no longer useful; whereas "making all-out 
attack and all-out defense" and "balancing au ack and 
defense" should be the proper guiding thought for the stud-
ies of modem information warfare.36 
This recent article reflects a gradual maturation of China's 
IW discourse, moving from a focus on offensive IW's asym-
metric advantages that favor tbe weaker party, a view predom-
inant in earlier scholarship, to a more cJear-headed 
reevaluation of China's underdeveloped IW defense (vis-a-vis 
a technologically advanced rival). However, some concepts of 
ea rlier scholarship are interesting in that they focus on gaps 
(theorized or real) in America's information systems. 
For example, through an information attack, the PRC 
seeks to successfully utilize the principles of asymmetric war-
fare by crippling a stronger military (US) through the isolation 
and penetration of a gap in its network. Chinese IW usually 
focuses on a singular "zone" of weakness. and is able to over-
come its traditionally inferior force by exploiting the weakness 
of the stronger military. The goal of American joint opera-
tions. or the networking of its military around information sys-
tems, is the comprehensive integration of units for all military 
purposes. By contrast, the goal of Chinese joint operations, as 
36 Bolh quoles are from Tang, " lnformarion Securily."' 
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indicated by Chinese military journals. is the concentration of 
its "capabilities" in a certain direction, or zone, with the inten-
tion of creating superiority over the enemy, in a specific area, 
at a specific time. 
Thus, the Chinese concentrate on exploiting weaknesses in 
stronger states rather than on developing their own compre-
hensive strength. Their joint operations aim to control and 
prevent the enemy's concentration of joint operations by 
attacking the enemy's information systems through false or 
deceptive moves. Such a strategy is aimed at destroying the 
enemy's capacity to make a decision, leaving the disorganized 
enemy to be a ''host of dragons without a head" (qunlong 
wushou).:17 This illustrates a fundamental attitudinal change in 
military thought: rather than competing with strong states, 
weak states are well served to explore asymmetric warfare. 
Besides network destruction, endless possibi lities exist for 
the development and execution of Chinese asymmetric war-
fare . The attainment of long-range precision interception 
weapons, the use of unused frequencies in civilian T.V. and 
radio broadcasting for information communication, encryp-
tion-based codes to prevent information stealing, space and 
satellites to obtain intelligence, use of saturated tactical ballis-
tic missiles, and the development of a directional infrared jam-
ming system all are among Chinese possibilities. 
Chjnese military literature also calls for a strategic "recon-
naissance'· and warning system, a battlefield information net-
work for the promotion of joint operations to better 
implement asymmetric warfare, and long-range, precision-
strike systems. Submarines play a large role in the Chinese 
asymmetric plan, as well as space warfare that can be con-
ducted by ships to destroy the enemy's satellite information. 
In 1996, the People's Liberation Army Daily recommended 
17 Liu Jun and Zhou Ruhong ... How to Concentrate 'Capability' in Joint 
Operations.'' Beiji11g Jiefangjwl Bao (Internet version) June 12. 2001. translated 
a~ .. PRC Army Paper on Concentrating 'Capability' in Joint Operations," FBIS 
Dai/1• Report: Cirino (Document Number: FB IS-CHI-200L-0612). 
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that China develop its own "unique lethal weapons" rather 
than try to replicate old frameworks with new technologies. It 
also suggested that a macro-control system be established to 
exploit developed countries that depend on networks and con-
sequently are ·'fragile and vulnerable. "38 
The asymmetric use of such weapons and techniques 
evinces the changing notions of traditionaL attrition-based 
power. A superior navy could be defeated through the disa-
b1ing of its space-based communications, the utilization of 
shore-based missiles, or "magic weapons," such as tactical 
laser weapons. Targets of asymmetric attack could be electri-
cal power grids, civilian aviation systems, transportation net-
works, seaports and shipping, highways, and television 
broadcast systems.39 
From a larger strategic standpoint. asymmetric warfare 
holds further appeal to Chinese leaders. Since 1978, Chinese 
leaders have pursued a fundamental national strategy that 
seeks to elevate China's overall national power by focusing on 
economic development. The PLA thinkers mentioned earlier 
argue that IW may allow their country to compete with the 
United States militarily, without sacrificing resources desig-
nated for economic growth. 
Overcoming the Superior with the Inferior 
At a COSTIND (Commission of Science, Technology, and 
Industry for National Defense) National Directors conference 
on December 22, 1995, Liu Huaqing, China 's top admiral, 
declared: 
Information warfare and electronic warfare are of key 
importance, while fighting on the ground can only serve to 
exploit the victory. Hence, China is more convinced (than 
ever] that as far as the PLA is concerned, a military revolu-
38 Pillsbury, China Debates the Fwure Security Environment, chapter 6. 
W Ibid. 
Lion with information warfare as the core has reached the 
stage where efforts must be made to catch up and overtake 
rivals (emphasis added).40 
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The PLA reckons that, throughout its history, it bas had to 
overcome several stronger rivaJs: the KMT (the Chinese Civil 
War), the US (the Korean War), and the USSR (the Sino-
Soviet border war). So the concept of "overcoming the supe-
rior with the inferior" is deeply ingrained in the PLA's ethos 
and mythology. Whereas in the past the PLA had been able to 
compensate for its firepower or manpower with superb uncon-
ventionaJ or nonmilitary strategies, such as guerrilla warfare, 
psychological warfare, political propaganda, and united fronts, 
the PLA now feels strongly that in the twenty-first century it 
must harness high technology in its struggle against its most 
probable and powerful strategic rival, the US. In developing 
IW, the Chinese still believe that superior strategies can help 
overcome technological deficiencies. 
The Chinese thinking is consistent with a recurring puzzle: 
why would a weaker party take on a stronger party, rather 
than accept an objectionable status quo, as Mor puts it? 
Asymmetric conflict challenges classic deterrence theory, 
which posits that the status quo deters anti-status quo power 
due to the former's preponderant capability. 
Asymmetric Conflict: An Enduring Allure 
The concept of the weak overcoming the strong is not a 
concept unrecognized by Western scholars. For example, 
Thazha V. Paul's study compared six cases of war initiated by 
the weaker powers and studied the dynamics of asymmetric 
conflicts.4 1 
In an interesting ar6cle published in 2001, Ivan Arreguin-
Toft examines under what conditions the weaker powers actu-
40 Quoted in Mulvenon, "l11e PLA and Information Warfare," 179. 
41 Paul. Asymmetric Conflicts. 
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ally win the war.42 His study shows that, among all the asym-
metric conflicts in the 1800-1998 period, the strong actors won 
70.8 percent of the time. whereas the weaker party won the 
other 29.2 percent. However, his more interesting findings 
show that, over time, the weaker actors won an increasing per-
centage of asymmetric conflicts. By breaking the period under 
study into four fifty-year segments, be finds that empirical evi-
dence for the nineteenth century supports the traditional IR 
dictums favoring the strong in asymmetric conflicts: the 
weaker actors won only 11.8 percent of the time for 1800-49, 
and 20.5 percent for 1850-99. 
However, the weaker actors fared much better as 
examined by the evidence from the twentieth century. They 
woo 34.9 percent of all asymmetric conflicts for 1900-49, and 
55 percent for 1950-98. That is, in the latter half of the twenti-
eth century, not only were the weaker actors more prone to 
initiating conflicts than in previous periods, but also they were 
more likely to win (with the Vietnam War being a prime exam-
ple)! These findings challenge traditional concepts of IR and 
should be of considerable interest to countries like China. 
Arrenguin-Toft proceeds to analyze the various scenarios 
under which strong states can be defeated by their weaker 
counterparts. He refers to the thinking of Mao Zedong that, 
when the weak fight the strong, the weak will benefit from cer-
tain interaction of direct and indirect approach strategies. He 
defines direct approaches as aiming to dismantle an adver-
sary's ability to fight, whereas indirect approaches aim to 
destroy the adversary's resolve to fight. He postulates that, 
when strong actors attack with a direct strategy and weak 
actors defend an indirect strategy, the weak actor will win. 
Conversely, when an attack occurs with strong actors using an 
indirect stra tegy and weak actors using a direct strategy, the 
weak actor also will win. In short, when the stronger and the 
weaker actors' approaches converge, the stronger actor is 
~2 Arreguin-Toft, "How the Weak Wm Wars." 
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expected to win. but when their approaches diverge, the 
weaker actor is expected to win. 
In both cases. the weak actor will win because, in both 
cases, the intersection of strategies will prove time-consuming 
for the stronger actor, while the weaker actor will remain resil-
ient. U nderlying this idea is the concept of "interest asymme-
try,'' whereby a strong state will be subject to the notion of 
.. relative interest"; because its survival is not at stake, it will be 
less willing to absorb causalities and other losses, while the 
weak state will make such sacrifices in the name of survival. 
The relative interest gives rise to "relative political vulnerabil-
ity," whereby domestic forces will require the withdrawal of 
the strong state's presence in a situation where it is suffering 
significant losses. even though that state may have the superior 
rniutary resources. 
A renguin-Toft sums up the expected effects of strategic 
approaches on conflict outcomes in a 2x2 matrix, with the 
expected winners identified in the cells. 
Weak-Actor Strategic Approach 
Direct Indirect 
Strong·Actor 
Strategic Approach 
Direct 
Indirect 
Strong 
actor 
Weak 
actor 
The Gulf War Wake-up Call 
Weak 
actor 
Strong 
actor 
The effective use of American IW during the Gulf War 
caused certain countries to examine their use of information 
weaponry. The PLA took notice not only of American supe-
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rior technology, but also of the destructive power of US joint 
operations, created through the "synergy" of multiservice 
actions. US joint operations included simultaneous attacks 
from Air Force and Navy aircraft, Army attack helicopters, 
and Navy strike missiles. Such operations blinded, deafened, 
and quickly destroyed opposing forces. TI1e PLA reaJized that 
both its "people's war" ground troops and its military doctrine 
were rendered obsolete. 
The PLA examined American military techniques, and 
determined that it would focus on strategic, operationaJ, and 
tactical reconnaissance. Meager resources granted for military 
modernization focused on joint operations as influenced by 
American use during the Gulf War; air and naval forces 
received funding because General Liu Huaqing realized land 
and sea battles could not be won without integrative support.43 
Thus, the Gulf War served as a catalyst for the PLA's develop-
ment of information warfare, and also served as a marked 
change in traditional power structures. 
IW to Spearhead Military Modernization? 
As stated before, military modernization, designated as the 
last of the Four Modernizations, received modest attention 
fiom the late 1970s to the early 1990s, largely due to budgetary 
limitations. However, the demise of the Soviet Union, the end 
of the Cold War, and China's double-digit growth in the 1990s 
have allowed China to substantially increase its military spend-
ing and to use its new-found wealth to acquire advanced weap-
ons and technologies.44 
43 Godwin, "Compensating for Deficiencies," 101. 
44 Ascertaining the Lrue figures of China's defense expenditure is a matter 
of considerable debate. In March 2002. Chinese finance minister Xiang 
Huaicheng announced that Chi.na is increasing military spending in 2002 by 17.6 
percent. or $3 billion. bringing lhe publicly reported total to $20 billion. 
However. the publicly disclosed figures do not include major spending for 
weapons research and foreign arms purchases. The Pentagon report estimates 
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Since China's defense industrial complex lags in developing 
high-technology equipment, China must find "selective pock-
ets of excellence,•· according to the late Chinese leader, Deng 
Xiaoping,45 IW plays a very important role in this strategic 
view of military modernization. 
As an example, China now arms its vast 1.5 million-strong 
reserve force. whose main role in the past had been to support 
PLA forces in defense against foreign intervention, with IW/ 
IO (information operations) missions. In response to Chair-
man Jiang Zemin's 1991 call for building common telecom sys-
tems for military and civilian use, China's reserve telecom 
regiments have become the high-tech link in the country's 
" people's war" theory.46 Ideas for uniting a people 's war with 
IW are finding fertile ground in China's reserve force. Several 
IW reserve forces already have been formed in Datong, 
Xiamen, Shanghai, Echeng, and Xian. Each is developing its 
own specialty as weU. For instance, Shanghai reserve forces 
focus on wireless telecom networks and double-encryption 
passwords. 
Chinese vs. Western Concepts of JW 
Assessing the implications of China's IW strategies 
requires an understanding of the distinct ways the Chinese and 
Americans approach the concepts, definitions, and limitations 
of information warfare. Cultural bias, traditions. and present 
that China's actual military spending could total $65 billion , making China the 
second largest defense spender in Lhe world after the US and the largest defense 
spender in Asia. Department of Defense, "Annual Report," 38. The report 
illustrates the various ways how China has concealed most of its defense 
modernization spending outside the PLA budget. 
45 Thomas. "China's Electronic Strategies," 48. 
46 See Zhang Fuyou. " With Joint Efforts Made by Army and People, 
Military Telecommunications Makes Leap Forward,'' Beijing Jiefangjull Bao 
(PLA Daily) September 9. 2000. Trans. FBIS. available at <http://sun3.lib/ 
uci.edu/-scla/microform/resources/f-g/f_049.htm>, quoted in Thomas. "China's 
Electronic Strate&ries,'' 47-8. 
196 
attitudes regarding warfare strategy prevent a uniform inter-
pretation of IW. Thus, Western and Chinese understandings 
of information as a mechanism of war may vary greatly. 
Among Western scholars. there is a consensus that infor-
mation warfare is a series of combat actions taken to attack 
the enemy's systems of information, while preserving one's 
own information and information systems. However, a tradi-
tional Soviet/Asian interpretation of information warfare is 
more encompassing, including the offensive and defensive 
nature of peacetime, crisis, and war operations. as well as 
national, strategic, and tactical levels of operations during 
times of war. 
Traditionally, Western military scholars have been con-
cerned with offensive information warfare as it relates to the 
enemy's command and control center, whereas Eastern mili-
tary scholars include the elements of electronic, psychological, 
virtual, and economic warfare, and even CNN coverage and 
the destabilization of financial institutions.47 By contrast. the 
Chinese/Soviet definition of military science involves not only 
military operational art, but also specific approaches broadly 
included in military art, such as psychological trickery, strata-
gems, etc. There is no American counterpart to thi s idea of 
military science. Chinese strategists study the changes in war 
as a scientific forecast, whereas American military scholars 
focus on the "almost accidental" role of military genius that 
changes concepts, allocations, and technologies.48 
Emerging differences in Western and Chinese interpreta-
tions of information warfare are significant because they chaJ-
lenge the conventional wisdom of power politics. Western 
theorists view information as a weapon to be used on a limited 
scope and as a mechanism to preserve more conservative 
structures. Eastern military theorists interpret information 
warfare as an equalizer through the use of asymmetric and 
~7 Ahrari, "U.S. Military Strategic Perspectives on the PRC." 1164. 
41i Pillsbury. Chinn Debates the Future Security Em•ironment, chapter 6. 
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broad-reaching techniques. Thus, discrepancies in the military 
philosophies have profound implications on international 
power politics. 
Challenges to Western Mainstream Concepts 
Although American success in the Gulf War awed the PLA 
with the execution of technology and joint operations, causing 
it to reexamine its military technologies and strategies, the 
Chinese seem aware of the peril of duplicating American IW. 
Instead, they seem more interested in developing " information 
warfare with Chinese characteristics." 
Chinese authors' writing on information warfare borrowed 
the Western idea of information dominance, but their methods 
for achieving information dominance differ from those of the 
West. Information warfare creates ambiguities and uncertain-
ties. complicating the tasks for military planners to prepare for 
contingencies. ln information warfare, superior strategies are 
as important as advanced technologies. The Chinese see the 
application of certain ancient stratagems as a way to possess a 
superior ability to execute strategy and to develop a comple-
mentary military doctrine for modernizing their forces. 
Interestingly. Chinese lW strategies revitalize the execu-
tion of the classic Thhty-Six Strategies: The Secret Art of 
War.49 There are clear IW connections to the first five strate-
gies, in which information creates an environment of anonym-
ity, ambiguity, and the confusion and dilemma of ethical 
retaliation that Chinese long have dominated traditionally.50 
If one fails to consider that America's comprehensive 
strength actually can become a weakness, as previously 
argued. then it may seem impossible that such isolated "pock-
ets of excellence" and strategizing even could dent a super-
-19 An English online translation of the Thirty-Six SrraJegies of Ancient 
China is at <hllp://www.chmastrategics.com>. 
~u Thomas. "China's Electronic Strategies." 
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power such as the United States. Thus, it ls plausible that, 
rather than trying to "catch up'' or replicate American meth-
ods of information warfare, Chinese IW doctrine emphasizes 
deception and strategizing - lessons that the American mili-
tary may take from China on how to exploit this new system of 
warfare. Through the rise of information warfare, America's 
comprehensive strength stiU can betray weaknesses and 
China's comprehensive weakness may become its strength -
the type of paradox Chinese military officials have recognized 
and exploited for centuries. 
As demonstrated by the Gulf War, the United States was 
the leader in the use of information warfare and the exploita-
tion of joint operations. The PRC has followed US doctrines 
on information warfare as they relate to technologies and joint 
operations strategies. However, this emulation by the PRC 
should not suggest that the PLA is any less of a potential 
threat to American security. As information weapons and 
technologies lead to joint operations, such network-based 
information systems become highly vulnerable to the rise of 
asymmetric attack. While the strength of the US lies in tech-
nological and strategic mechanisms for information, the mech-
anisms' movements leave significant network gaps open for 
asymmetric attack, granting the PRC the exercise of its strong 
suit - asymmetric tactics. 
The PRC's history boasts a legacy of the weak defeating 
the strong. So while it is true that the US may lead the PRC in 
information technologies and techniques, the PRC's potential 
threat cannot be dismissed both because its military history 
encompasses the techniques of asymmetric warfare and 
because its interpretation of warfare is far more encompassing 
than a traditional Western view. This allows for a far greater 
scope of destruction - entering private, civilian spheres. 
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Seeing Chinese IW in Action 
Despite the assiduous scholarly interest concerning IW. the 
PRCs IW capability is hitherto far from operational (or 
"weaponized'') . This section provides early glimpses into the 
various ways China has conducted early examples of IW as a 
way to speculate how future conflicts may look. Applying IW 
has presented technical ironies to the PRC: the presumed 
assurance of information domination and advantage of asym-
metry does not work entirely in the PRC's favor; and the PRC 
is not immune from the same vulnerabilities that its JW war-
riors seek to exploit in the adversary. This section focuses on 
L) cybernationalism, and 2) IW combined with amphibious 
assault. 
Cybernationalism: When Nationalism Meets the Internet 
Scholars have discussed the reasons for the rising national-
ism in China in recent years -government manipulation, pub-
lic confidence and pride as a result of economic development, 
and anti -American sentiment - and speculated about the 
implica tions of this nationalism on regional security and US 
policy.51 
This rising nationalism coincided with an explosive growth 
in China's Internet population. The best industry publication 
estimates that, in barely three years from 1997 to 2000, China's 
online population had increased from 200,000 to 16.9 million, 
making China one of the largest and fastest-growing 
markets.52 
51 Sec Michael Yahuda. "The Changing Faces of Chinese Nationalism: The 
Dimensions of Statehood," in Michael Leifer, ed., Asian Nationalism (London: 
Routledge, 2000). 21-37; and Edward Friedman and Barrell L. McCormick, eds., 
What If China Doesn 't Democratize? Implications for War and Peace {Armonk. 
NY: M.E. Sharpe, 2000). 
52 By another measure- Internet "penetration ra te" (online population as 
a percentage of total population - China remains sparsely wired. For the same 
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The advent of information technology and its populariza-
tion curiously have lent a •·weapon of choice" to Chinese 
nationalism. Chinese chat rooms now are fjJjed with strident 
nationalistic messages. Most of these outbursts can be dis-
missed as harmless, irresponsible "freedom of expression,·· 
and they seem to enjoy the tacit permission of the authorities. 
who view protests in cyberspace as a preferable alternative to 
protests in the streets. However, occasionally when China has 
been amid a foreign policy flap with an outside actor (the US, 
Japan, or Taiwan), these disparate expressions have coalesced 
or been mobilized to promote the PRC's interests and view-
points - a phenomenon this article sbaiJ call "cybernational-
ism." Two cases are in point. 
According to a Taiwanese report based on intelligence 
sources.53 after former Taiwan President Lee Teng-hui enunci-
ated his view in July 1999 that, henceforth , relations between 
Taiwan and the mainland should be "special state-to-state rela-
tions," hundreds of Chinese backers attacked or attempted to 
invade Taiwanese Web servers. Retaliation from Taiwanese 
hackers resulted in the destruction of many Web sites and 
computers on both sides. The 1999 ·'cyberwar" actually 
exposed the vulnerability of computer systems on both sides. 
The same report quoted China's PLA Daily, which advocated 
the need to cultivate high-quality ' 'Internet warriors" who 
could be trained by select universities in China and combined 
with computer experts from the private sector. 
Chinese cybernationalism reached a zenith in May 2001, as 
a result of a series of tensions in US-PRC relations: the 
April J collision of military planes, President Bush's statement 
that the US would do '·whatever it takes" to help Taiwan 
period ( 1997-2000), China 's lnternet users rose from 0.00 I percent of the total 
population to 1.34 percent. NUA lntcmet Surveys, ·'NUA Internet Ho\\- Many 
Online: Asia." 2001 , available at <http://www.nua.ie/surveyslhow_many_online/ 
asia.html>. 
53 Chen Thng-lung, .. Secret Document from Military Intelligence Bureau: 
After ·State-to-State' Theory. China and Taiwan Began ' Hacker' lntemet War 
(in Chioese) <hllp://content.sina.com/news/51/93/519320_1_b5gif.btmb. 
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defend itself from Chinese attack, and the sale to Taiwan of a 
robust package of defensive arms. A self-styled Honker's 
Union, a network of Chinese nationalistic hackers. took up 
China's nationalist cause. The group's name in Chinese means 
" Red hackers," indicating the political motives for their 
actions. Honkers maintained that they differed from other 
hackers because they did not act out of malice.54 They utilized 
modern IT (their Web site, e-mail system, and downloadable 
viruses) to recruit fellow patriots in a ··people's war" against 
the US by attacking thousands of American Web sites. They 
announced in advance that their attacks would coincide with 
politically sensitive dates. such as May 1 (International Work-
ers' Day) and May 18 (the second anniversary of the NATO 
bombing of the Chinese embassy in Belgrade).55 They suc-
ceeded in defacing one thousand US Web sites with pro-China 
messages, paralyzing an untold number of computer systems, 
penetrating the public information page of the White House, 
and destroying all data on Web servers ro which they were 
able to gain access. But their attacks also triggered a furious 
retaliation by hackers based in the US, who indiscriminately 
attacked all sites with the domain name '·.en," resulting in the 
destruction of hundreds of Chinese Web sites. 
What is the practical impact of this early showing of possi-
ble IW? One can view the above case of "cyberwar·· as a vir-
tual substitute to an actual armed conflict between the US and 
the PRC, in which there is no casualty. However, this case 
actually reveals an incipient ··mutual assured destruction" 
(MAD) of some sort in the application of TW. The Chinese 
boast of IW's offensive advantage was bumbled by the vulner-
ability of its own information systems from the adversary's 
54 ·'Chinese Hackers Yield in Cyberwar wilh !he U.S.," lmemativnal 
/Jerald Tribune, May II. 200 I: anti ··Chinese Hackers Call Truce in China-U.S. 
Cyberwar." Rewers. May 9, 2001: accessed from Le.xis·Ne:ws. 
55 US Facing Chinese Cyber Blitz." BBC Nei\'S. May 3. 2001 <hllp://ncws. 
bbc.co.uk/ hi/englishlsci/ tcch/newsid_13 11 000/1311258.slm>; and "Chinese 
Hackers Warn of Allacks on U.S. Web Sites," Reuter. May I, 2001 <http://daily 
news.yahoo.com/h/nm/200 I 050 l/lslusa_hackers_uc_2.b Lml>. 
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attack. Other than leaving the nuisance of having to clean up 
these electronic equivalents of graffiti, China's IW has not fun-
damentally changed its balance of power vis-a-vis the US nor 
advanced its goal of absorbing Taiwan. "Digital MAD" damp-
ened early Chinese euphoria over rw. 
JW in a Taiwan Strait Contingency 
A second case of IW application entails more significant 
security implications. PLA officers have promoted IW as 
an effective weapon to subdue Taiwan and deter possible 
American intervention.56 Here, the PLA seeks to gain infor-
mation domination in a conflict with Taiwan by attacking 
Taiwan's command and control centers and information net-
works, and by conducting propaganda and political warfare. 
The purpose is to incorporate Taiwan into the PRC by "subdu-
ing the enemy without actually fighting," a Ia Sun Tzu, and by 
denying possible American military intervention. 
l11e recent Pentagon report points out that, although 
China's communist leaders have professed their rhetorical 
commitment to a peaceful unification with Taiwan (on 
Beijing's terms), certain trends, such as official statements 
lengthening the list of conditions under which Beijing would 
use force against Taiwan and the PRC's ambitious military 
modernization program. may reflect an increasing willingness 
to consider the use of force to achieve unification. The report 
states that "Beijing's primary political objective in any Taiwan-
related crisis, however, likely would be to compel Taiwan 
authorities to enter into negotiations on Beijing's terms and to 
undertake operations with enough rapidity to preclude third-
56 Liu Yubua et al., "A Study oo the Information Warfare Issues Involved 
in a Combined Landing Baule," in A Study on rile Issues of Our Military 's 
Information Warfare [io Chinese] (Beijing: National Derense University Press, 
1999). 
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party intervention."57 
The Pentagon report concurs with the view of certain ana-
lysts that the PLA's offensive capabilities improve as each year 
passes, providing Beijing with an increasing number of credi-
ble options to intimidate or actually attack Taiwan.58 
In addition to other weapons slated for asymmetric war-
fare, such as ballistic missiles, the PLA views IW as a credible 
military option for achieving Beijing's political objectives and 
has made considerable efforts toward making IW a real 
alternative. 
The PLA conducted large-scale war games in the Taiwan 
Strait in summer 2001. For the first time, the exercises began 
with information warfare aimed at electronically paralyzing 
enemy communications and command systems. Also, for the 
first time, a new electronic warfare unit was deployed over the 
Strait.59 In its exercises in 2002, the PLA incorporated more 
sophisticated items of 10/IW. 
1l1is scenario presents a new challenge to US strategic 
planners. Most analysts hitherto have: 
• Dismissed the Chinese invasion threat due to the high 
threshold for success ( logistical difficulties. Taiwanese 
resistance, and international. intervention), 
• Argued that Taiwan's smaller military can maintain a 
qualitative edge until at least 2005. 
• Questioned whether Beijing has realistic military 
options vis-a-vis Taiwan, despite its consistent refusal to 
renounce the use of force and its occasional saber-rat-
tling against Taiwan, and 
• Believed that a probable, albeit not guaranteed, US mil-
itary intervention (in the case of unprovoked atLack on 
57 Department of Defense, ''Annual Report." 46. 
58 [bid.. 47. Representing this only-a-matter-of-Lime ''iew is David 
Shambaugh. "A Mauer of 1imc: Taiwan's Eroding Military Advantage," 
Washington Quarterly 23, no. 3 (Spring 2000): 119-33. 
59 Craig S. Smith. "Beijing Stages War Games, Mostly for Taiwan," NeiV 
York Times, July 10, 2001. p. A6; and Vincent Wei-cheng Wang, '"Lnformation 
Warfare' Changes Taiwan Equation.'' Washington Times, July 13, 200 1. p. A 18. 
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Taiwan) serves to deter Beijing (the policy of so-called 
strategic ambiguity). 
However, many Chinese strategists now believe that IW 
bas lowered the threshold for a successful military campaign 
against Taiwan and bas increased the utility of an offensive 
strategy, because it holds promise for "winning the battle with-
out fighting" (Sun Tzu's adage) and "overcoming the superior 
with the inferior" (Mao's guerrilla strategy). Properly exe-
cuted (with deception, surprise, precision, and decisiveness) 
along with other coercive weapons (e.g., missile strikes and a 
naval blockade), IW may help bring Taiwan to its knees and 
deny American intervention. 
Paradoxically. both technology and misperception may 
cause China to be more, rather than less, likely to use force. 
regardless of the words or deeds of Taiwan's leaders. So the 
application of information technology in international con-
flicts. such as cross-Strait tensions, may have a negative 
impact. 
However, the perceived advantage to offense in IW will 
last only if the adversary fails to take proper countermeasures 
to augment its offensive and defensive IW capabilities. To 
counter China's IW development, Taiwan bas made its own 
endeavors in IW. In summer 2001, Taiwan 's military estab-
lished its own electronic-warfare unit.60 In June 2002, Taiwan 
for the first time incorporated a drill in its decades-old Wan-
An air-raid drill to boost the island's Internet defenses against 
hacker attacks, especially from China.61 A white paper 
released by Taiwan's Defense Ministry in July 2002 states that 
a three-pronged defense strategy was envisaged in the face of 
increasing threats from China's military satellites, ballistic mis-
sile technology, and information warfare, 
60 Brian Hsu, "Army Forms Ils First Electronic-Warfare Unit." Taipei 
Times , July 31. 2001 <http://www.taipeitimcs.com/news/200 1/07/31/prim/ 
0000096461 >. 
bl "Web 'Drill' to Tackle Hackers.'' Australian , April 30. 2002. p. C2 (from 
AFP wire). accessed from Le.xis-Nexus. 
• To prevent war by building a sustainable defense capa-
bility so that "the enemy dare not rashly wage a war," 
• To maintain stability in the Taiwan Strait through dia-
logue and exchange on security issues between the two 
sides, and 
• ln the event of an invasion, to be ready to defend 
itself.62 
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The Taiwanese white paper notes China's expanding mili-
tary power, including its efforts to acquire capabilities, such as 
space, e lectronic, information, and precision attack warfare, 
which would enable it to conduct first strikes in wars against 
Taiwan. In response, it calls for Taiwan to build a "compact 
but delicate. highly capable" modern force by reducing the 
number but increasing the quality of personnel and strength-
ening technological capability. Included in the deterrence 
strategy are establishing an early warning system; building 
offensive and defensive capabilities to conduct information 
and electronic operations; and maintaining air superiority and 
naval dominance. 
Until a "digital MAD'' of some sort is established in the 
Taiwan Strait, the PRC's IW development has introduced 
uncertainties and risks in this volatile region. This is a case of 
how technology, combined with intentions and (mis)percep-
tions, may become a destabilizing factor for international 
security. 
Conclusion 
This article has explained the perceived strategic utility of 
IW to the PRC and reviewed the PLA's discourse and early 
applications of IW. The remaining space is devoted to a brief 
discussion of some of the implications of asymmetric warfare. 
62 Goh Sui Noi, ·'Taiwan's Strategy: To Deter and Build Trust; A White 
Paper Outlines the Island 's Strategy to Build 'Sustainable Defense· 10 Prevent a 
Possible Invasion by China,'' Srrait Times. July 24. 2002. accessed from Le:ris-
Nexus. 
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Rather than giving definitive answers, the discussion is in-
tended to raise questions for further research. 
First of all, interstate conflicts have not ended. Instead, as 
illustrated in the case of IW, they now are driven increasingly 
by new technological factors and have taken on new forms , 
particularly the multiplication of actors (state and nonstate. 
both engaging in interstate conflict). 
This raises the issue of technical irony. The irony stems 
from the double-edged nature of information technology. On 
the one hand, today a nation's economic prosperity and mili-
tary strength rely on technological supremacy. On the other 
hand, the dependence of postindustrial societies on the 
[nternet and computer networks also gives the weaker parties 
(states or terrorists) opportunities to exploit this vulnerability. 
Information warfare has the allure of an asymmetric war. 
There is a further irony: although information technology 
entails beneficial potentials (narrowing the wealth gaps by 
empowering the poor, both within and across countries. or 
contributing to peace by virtue of deterrence) , it can cause 
misperceptions and miscalculations on the part of the weaker 
offensive party that overestimates the utility of offense and 
underestimates the cost of defense. 
In the case of the PRC, IW may tempt PLA commanders 
to move away from active defense toward a preemptive strike. 
China's design for Taiwan most likely is a short. decisive blow 
that results in Taipei's capitulation, i.e., a fait accompli 
presented to the international community, rather than a pro-
tracted campaign, such as amphibious invasion or embargo, 
that has to deal with uncertain consequences from other 
actors. 
fW appears especially attractive in this regard, because it 
promises a quick resolution of the military contingency and 
low casualty in order to preserve Taiwan 's industrial and com-
mercial assets for Beijing. 
As stated before, Taiwan has responded with its own IW 
endeavors. Whether Taipei's strategy aims to protect its own 
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information resources or to mimic Beijing's ·'asymmetric war-
fare " strategy by targeting Beijing's vulnerable areas, will have 
implications for whether this development will contribute to 
stability by virtue of the threat of a digital MAD, or to more 
instability by introducing a spiraling security dilemma. 
Second, how seriously should American defense planners 
take the PRC's endeavor in IW? 1l1at the PLA is immersing 
itself in concepts of RMA and that Beijing's acknowledgement 
of a doctrine-capability gap perversely may convince it to com-
mit more resources to the development of the weapons and 
equipment called for by its IW doctrine, are of natural concern 
to Pentagon planners who have the responsibility for main-
taining peace and stability in the Western Pacific. 
Although it is true that, at the present tinle, modernization 
of the Chinese force has lagged behind doctrinal development, 
China 's recent history (e.g., indigenous development of atomic 
bombs in 1964 and aUeged indigenous development of the 
warhead miniaturization technology) suggests that develop-
ment of an ·'JW with Chinese characteristics" is not entirely 
far-fetched. Americans ignore, at their own peril. that the syn-
ergy that results from technology and strategy in the informa-
tion age can take more than one (US) form. 
This article has not given definitive answers to the 
problems of information warfare, but it encourages further 
research that can help us to "seek truth'' more aggressively on 
this important emergent issue. 
